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The Adoption of the Corporate Governance Code in a Developing Economy:  
A Study of Reality and Appearances 
 
Abstract 
 
Following the recent adoption of a national code of corporate governance (CG) in a developing 
economy (Mauritius), the authors assessed the level of CG adoption by locally-listed companies 
using annual report disclosures. Whilst a satisfactory level of adoption is observed for a number 
of CG requirements/mechanisms, a number of disclosure aspects (or the lack thereof) - involving 
the status/role of independent non-executive directors, directors’ remuneration/related interests, 
and the actual operation of sub-board meetings – is suggestive of a selective adoption and 
behaviour towards the CG code. In addition, a significant number of compliance statements were 
found to be unrelated or even inconsistent with the actual level of adoption. The authors 
contended that some of the companies appeared to project an appearance of CG adoption which 
was at odds with the reality - possibly in bid to maintain or enhance organizational legitimacy. A 
selected number of directors from these companies were also interviewed to assess their 
attitudes, perceptions and motivations vis-à-vis the CG implementation/disclosure process. 
Overall, organizational legitimacy, rather than a strict efficiency-led rationale, does emerge as a 
theoretical explanation but companies/directors’ conceptualisation of organizational legitimacy 
differ, thereby explaining the varying levels of CG adoption at company level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Mauritius; Organizational Legitimacy. 
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Introduction  
Over the last two decades, corporate governance (CG) codes/mechanisms have been the subject 
of increasing interest worldwide, as it is believed they contribute to better organizational 
outcomes, board effectiveness and efficiency as well as improved investor confidence and 
enhance shareholder value. Although some of the original attempts at developing a corporate 
governance (CG) code can be traced to the US and UK context (e.g. Cadbury Report, 1992), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is credited for having 
developed in 1999 (Revised in 2004) a framework for the development of CG - known as the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance – which has been widely used by developed and 
developing countries alike. A national code of CG thus seeks to embody these principles and to 
present a set of norms and behaviour (Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguilera, 2004 p. 320) relating to the 
activities of the directors, their relationship to shareholders/stakeholders, audit and information 
disclosures, and the determination of executive remuneration.  
 
However, there is an ongoing debate as to extent of the incremental benefits of CG for 
companies and countries. For example, Burton (2000), Patterson (2000) and Korac-Kakabadse et 
al. (2001) reviewed the CG literature and reported that there was not yet any conclusive evidence 
of a positive contribution. On the other hand, Mallin (2001, p. 78) argues that despite the mixed 
evidence, there is a widely held perception that corporate governance does make a difference to 
the bottom line. Mueller (2006, p. 216) counter-argues that there is unequivocal evidence that 
corporate governance institutions affect company performance. Yet, for example, Bauer et al 
(2004) found a negative relationship between CG standards and earnings-based ratios, 
contradicting a similar study by Gompers et al. (2003). Finally, a survey of UK directors 
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(Moxey, 2004) showed that more directors believed the code’s requirements were becoming too 
bureaucratic and burdensome. 
 
Even if one acknowledges that the link between CG and organizational/managerial outcomes is a 
consistently beneficial one, the fact remains that a significant number of country studies - in the 
developing/emerging as well as the developed world - report instances of diverse, piecemeal, 
selective and/or symbolic levels of CG adoption/disclosure (e.g. Ow-Yong and Guan, 2000; 
Pellens et al., 2001; Hussain and Mallin, 2002; Solomon et al., 2003; Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 
2004; Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006; MacNeil and Li, 2006). 
Most of the aforementioned authors offer country-level reasons for such diversity such as 
mismatch with the legal systems, the ownership structures, the extent of family control, the types 
of financing arrangements, and the attitudes of institutional shareholders and other actors (e.g. 
directors, auditors, company secretary). Also, some authors, such as Yakasai (2001, p. 239), 
question altogether the relevance of the OECD model in some of the Third World countries due 
to the unstructured and informal nature of their economies. Overall, however, the studies rarely 
dwell beyond such macro-level interpretations/findings from the sample and do not draw enough 
inferences from the micro (company) level and/or from the actors involved in the 
implementation/disclosure decisions.   
 
In light of the above, we contend that an interpretive perspective might be useful in further 
understanding the reasons for CG adoption/disclosure ‘behaviour’. Our central argument is that 
the reality of adoption may be becoming increasingly decoupled from the appearance of 
adoption. In other words, while claiming to adhere to the CG philosophy, companies may 
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selectively implement elements of the national CG code more for reputational and/or socially-
motivated reasons than purely for rational efficiency- and profit-maximising ones1.  
 
In addition a notable characteristic of national CG codes has been on making them less 
prescriptive, less enforceable (as opposed to being clearly required by national legislation) and 
more flexible2. For instance, the growing use of the ‘comply or explain’ approach in several 
countries is an acknowledgement that companies (directors and company secretaries) will 
approach the CG code differently, due to size, structure, and organization (MacNeil and Li, 
2006)3. However, this also prompted MacNeil and Li (2006, p. 486) to argue that the benefits of 
such flexibility may be overstated. Cadbury (2000, p. 9) agreed that specific mechanisms in the 
CG code could differ cross-nationally but all codes would at least rest on the two important 
principles: (a) the need for adequate disclosure and (b) the need for appropriate checks and 
balances in the governance structure (cited in Cuervo-Cazurra and Aguilera, 2004, p. 320) – but 
this condition is not explicitly included in CG codes. In this respect, it is argued that the 
flexibility in the ‘comply or explain’ principle may have encouraged a selective approach to the 
adoption of CG principles/structures. 
Furthermore, it appears that the original message of “CG for better performance” is being 
gradually amplified to include other direct or indirect benefits, hence promoting a panacea 
characteristic to the corporate governance code (e.g. refer to the OECD’s White Paper on 
Corporate Governance in Asia, 2003, p. 3). For instance, the references linking CG and a 
number of corporate scandals/failures – such as Enron and WorldCom - are increasingly 
emphasized in the business world and often dramatized in the media4. However, it is rarely 
mentioned that companies (such as Enron) inappropriately implemented certain CG requirements 
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(Mardjono, 2005, p. 283) - whilst operating in one of the most regulated financial environment in 
the world. Also, CG adoption is regularly put forward as a key criterion - particularly to an 
audience of developing and emerging economies - in satisfying the requirements of 
multinationals and supra-national bodies, such as institutional investors, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund5, thus leading to higher (foreign) investment (e.g. see Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006. p. 127; Rueda-Sabater, 2000). Within the African context, this 
rhetoric is heightened, with corporate governance adoption being associated to more ethical, 
more professional and less corrupt behaviour (e.g. Rossouw, 2005; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006) - in 
line with the supposedly ‘better’ governance practices used in the developed world. However, at 
the national level, anecdotal evidence suggests that governments and/or other regulatory bodies 
further re-interpret the role of corporate governance in light of the local socio-economic realities 
and their own political agenda. Overall, it can be argued that this construct known as corporate 
governance (embodied in a national code) is becoming a less universal one due to the diverse 
interpretations and motivations of the different actors in the field e.g. directors, owners, 
institutional shareholders, government/regulators, and other stakeholders. 
 
In light of the above, the objective of this study is to critically assess the factors surrounding CG 
implementation, by examining its recent adoption/disclosure in context i.e. amongst companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius, and by analyzing the views of a group of directors 
from these companies. There are several motivations for this study and the selected country. 
Firstly, the extant literature largely adopts an agency and rational perspective towards CG 
implementation. This prompted Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004, p. 424) to suggest 
alternative explanations, namely that CG practices may be adopted, to a certain extent, to 
 6 
legitimize organizations and meeting societal expectations. They cited (2004, p. 424) Tolbert and 
Zucker’s (1983, p. 26) arguments that the adoption of practices “fulfils symbolic rather than 
task-related requirements”, thereby encouraging piecemeal and/or symbolic adoption rather than 
an appropriate rationally-led level of CG implementation. Similarly, Qu and Leung (2006) found 
some evidence to support the relevance of legitimacy theory to explain CG-related voluntary 
disclosures in Chinese listed companies. This study is therefore an attempt at considering the 
relevance of this perspective to CG adoption at micro-level. Secondly, most studies use a single 
data collection method (annual reports) to assess the level of adoption and then proceed to 
generalize the reasons for such levels of implementation. To our knowledge, none of the 
reviewed studies sought to adopt a dual approach to data collection, in a bid to assess the in-
depth motivations at company level i.e. using both annual reports and gathering views/opinions 
from relevant directors - as members of the board which decided to adopt specific CG 
mechanisms and disclosures6.  
 
Thirdly, the case of Mauritius is a notable example to consider within the African context since 
Roussouw (2005, p. 95) specifically praises this country as one of the few African nations that 
has made significant progress in CG. Yet, this was based on the fact that the government had 
published the code, whilst there has not been a study of actual implementation. Finally, the 
formal adoption of the national code for corporate governance is a fairly recent event (2005), 
allowing for an exploration of the CG issues within Mauritius’ current socio-economic and 
political context, such as the end of preferential trade agreements; declining competitiveness and 
foreign direct investment; a tightly knit family-oriented business community being pressured to 
open up and innovate; and a current political agenda aimed at ‘democratising’ the economy – l 
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issues which are not necessarily different from other developing economies, particularly within 
the African continent. 
 
Overall, this study seeks to contribute to the literature by adopting a more interpretive 
perspective - rather than relying only on a rational/functional one - to CG adoption. It is hoped 
this will assist policy makers/researchers in developing a holistic view of the motivations and 
issues behind CG implementation. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next 
section briefly reviews the relevant empirical and theoretical literature, following which the 
specific context of Mauritius and CG is presented. The research methods and findings are 
explained and discussed. Finally, the conclusion and relevance of the findings to the CG 
literature will be provided.  
 
Literature Review 
Findings from Selected Recent Country Studies   
Over the last decade, there have been more recent and rapid adoptions of CG codes worldwide, 
particularly in developing and emerging countries (Hussain and Mallin, 2002). As mentioned 
earlier, the published evidence generally indicates a varying level of CG implementation and a 
selection of the most recent country studies are summarised and tabulated in Appendix 1. Due to 
their different research methods and time periods, these studies cannot be directly compared but 
their major findings and interpretations are taken as illustrations of a wider and general 
phenomenon of selective, piecemeal and/or symbolic implementation of CG 
processes/mechanisms. Three notable aspects emerge from these studies. 
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Firstly, the reviewed studies focused on companies listed on the local stock exchanges. Even if 
one acknowledges the different mechanisms and listing rules applicable to the different national 
markets, the general expectation is that listed companies will be more transparent and more 
amenable to providing more relevant and timely information, compared to unlisted companies. 
However, the results show varied – and sometimes very low – levels of CG adoption for critical 
aspects of the national code, namely the CEO/Board Chairman split, the setting up of formal sub-
committees (audit, nomination, and remuneration), and the inclusion of a reasonable proportion 
of non-executive and independent directors7. In some cases, the conclusions to these findings 
tend to be focused on providing recommendations on how to reach higher 
compliance/implementation, such as the elimination of barriers (e.g. family control and cronyism 
in Solomon et al., 2003), the education of the “less sophisticated” owner managers (e.g. 
Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). In other cases, the issue is viewed as a ‘cultural’ one but 
the details of what this exactly constitutes are left unexplained (Alves and Mendes, 2004; 
Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; Hussain and Mallin, 2003). 
 
Secondly, in analysing some studies of implementation, instances of paradox and inconsistency 
emerge, raising questions on the priorities/importance attached to specific CG aspects by the 
individual companies. For example, in the case of Alves and Mendes (2004), whilst only about a 
third of companies disclosed a CG statement, more than 75% of the companies provided 
information on directors’ attendance to meetings. In another study, the role of outside directors is 
perceived to be very high and there are an equal proportion of outside/executive directors 
(Solomon et al., 2003) in most companies. However, some of the key sub-board structures 
designed to empower such directors – such as the audit committee or there remuneration 
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committee – are not in place. Or in cruder instances, such committees are set up but rarely meet 
or operate (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). The nomination of independent non-executive 
directors also appears to be a general issue in that the actual status of the incumbents are 
diversely interpreted (Ow-Yong and Guan, 2000; Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006), resulting 
in these directors being perceived as independent in appearance rather than in fact.    
 
Thirdly, some authors have alluded to the need for a more interpretive perspective on CG 
adoption, particularly in light of the findings mentioned in the previous paragraph.  Ow-Yong 
and Guan (2000, p. 130) conclude that many companies in Malaysia comply only “in form” 
rather than in spirit, and “pay lip service” to the substance of the code’s principles and 
requirements. Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006, p. 134 & 137) considered that the majority of 
companies in Cyprus complied in “a patchy and selective manner”, and that the establishment of 
the major CG committees - without actual evidence of regular meetings - was “tokenistic”. 
These observations are suggestive of a non-rational and non-functional motivation in CG 
adoption but the authors did not link their observations to any theoretical framework. Hence, it 
would be relevant to consider an alternative theoretical perspective and - particularly in relation 
to the institutional perspective and the concept of organizational legitimacy.    
 
Theoretical Perspective to CG Adoption 
According to Tolbert and Zucker (1983, p. 25), institutionalization is the “process through which 
components of formal structure become widely accepted, as both appropriate and necessary, and 
serve to legitimate organizations”. Thus, CG practices are adopted to maintain or enhance 
organizational legitimacy i.e. if the company adopts a certain CG practice (say, a remuneration 
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committee), the organization is then viewed by society (the public, government, shareholders) as 
a ‘professional’ and ‘efficient’ one, although the actual benefits of having such a committee 
might be inexistent or insignificant. As argued by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), and 
supported by Scott (2001, p. 157), it does not mean that every CG practice is purely adopted 
either for efficiency or legitimation reasons, but rather that these two seemingly mutually 
exclusive motivations both compete with and complement each other (2004, p. 424). A similar 
set of arguments is captioned within “Legitimacy Theory”, which has been frequently invoked to 
explain social and environmental disclosures in annual reports (e.g. Deegan, 2000, 2002; also in 
Woodward et al., 1996).  However, in considering the above, a common aspect emerges: CG 
practices/mechanisms are adopted in companies not necessarily as a result of meeting a 
theoretical ideal derived from mainstream economics (Scapens, 1994, p. 316) but perhaps more 
as a result of the wider set of organizational, political, and socio-economic factors.  
 
In empirically examining the level of CG diffusion in a sample of 49 countries, Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) formulate both social legitimation and efficiency propositions. For the 
former, they hypothesised (2004, p. 426) that exogenous pressures are exerted to introduce CG 
codes/practices at national level in a bid to socially legitimise companies. The exogenous 
pressures were disaggregated into three variables: the country’s level of integration in the global 
economy, the higher levels of liberalization and the level of investment from foreign institutional 
investors i.e. if country is more globalized, more liberalized and receives more foreign 
institutional investment, then it would have a higher level of CG adoption due to the social 
legitimation phenomenon. However, the authors only found marginal support for the government 
liberalization variable. This may be viewed as a very modest support for the institutional 
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argument but the study also illustrates the difficulties in capturing concepts such as ‘social 
legitimation’ from secondary data, proxy variables and a purely quantitative analysis.  
 
Similarly, Qu and Leung (2006) developed expectations, based on legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories, on the extent of CG disclosures amongst Chinese listed companies and formally 
considered the influence of culture (as measured by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions). They relied 
solely on annual report disclosures and found some limited evidence of a legitimacy/stakeholder 
influence, due to the higher level of importance given to employee-related disclosures compared 
to other types of CG disclosures (2006, p. 255). However, no evidence was forthcoming on the 
more central aspects of CG codes, such as composition of boards or disclosures of directors’ 
remuneration. Furthermore, the authors acknowledged that they could not firmly demonstrate the 
impact of culture on the level of disclosures.  
 
In conclusion, the above pinpoints to the relevance of a different theoretical foundation (not 
necessarily a competing one) to examine CG adoption by companies. However, one first needs to 
appreciate the country’s political and socio-economic factors applicable to these companies.     
 
The Country Context  
Mauritius, a former French and British colony, has a population of approximately 1.2 million and 
covers 719 square miles (1,860 square kilometres). There is no recorded indigenous population 
and the ethnic origins/religious faiths of the current population are quite diverse. Mauritians are 
mainly descendants of (a) Indian indentured labourers (Hindu and Muslim faiths), (b) Chinese 
workers and traders (c) African slaves, made to work in the sugar estates and (d) the initial 
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European settlers and land owners. Mauritius is often hailed as an example of multiculturalism 
but divisions and strains on the basis of ethnic and religious divisions occasionally surface.   
There is a very strong affinity to the ethnic roots, ancestral languages, cultures, and/or religious 
affiliation - locally referred to as ‘communities’ e.g. refer to Eriksen (1994). 
 
Since Mauritius forms part of various African political and trade blocks, its past economic and 
social situation has usually been compared to countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this 
respect, and particularly since the 1980s, Mauritius has performed generally well in terms of 
economic growth, education, health and living standards. In 2005, the per capita income was 
US$ 5,2608. More recently however, an economic slowdown has been observed, due in part to 
the dismantlement of various preferential trade agreements (mainly in sugar and textile export) 
and declining foreign direct investment (FDI), leaving tourism as the major expanding sector in 
the economy9. 
 
In a government-sanctioned World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC, 2002, p. 1-2), it was concluded that the ownership structure of listed companies in 
Mauritius remains dominated by a small group of family-owned companies. In addition, these 
family-owned holding companies typically own a variety of different enterprises that have little, 
if any cross-synergies and might therefore be more viable as separate operations. Many of the 
companies’ asset values are high – due to large landholdings – but the earnings generated are 
relatively low, and the ROSC report contended that CG could help in “unlocking shareholder 
value” (2002, p. 15) . The continued influence of family-driven management also leads to a high 
level of opacity in the running of private-sector companies. Coincidentally, close to the time of 
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the publication of the World Bank report, the business community came under intense public 
scrutiny, following various cases of frauds occurring in three high-profile public-listed 
companies - involving some of their directors and senior managers10. However, regardless of 
these fraud cases, the government at that time had already committed to the rapid adoption of 
‘foreign investor-friendly’ measures, aimed at re-starting FDI flows. For example, all listed and 
large public companies were already required to adopt all international financial reporting and 
auditing (IFRS/ and ISA) standards and a new Financial Reporting Council was set up to 
regulate auditors and monitor the quality of financial statements. In a similar thrust, the 
development of a corporate governance code in Mauritius was viewed as a way to maintain and 
improve international investment whilst enhancing the level of transparency, efficiency and 
accountability in private companies. This is echoed in a statement by the Minister responsible for 
Corporate Affairs (Mr S. Kushiram): 
“A key objective to corporate governance reform is to enhance shareholder value and 
corporate efficiency. The production of this code is not a cosmetic exercise. [In addition]…. by 
improving the conditions for greater value and wealth creation, good corporate governance 
will attract larger flows of much needed capital and allocate these more efficiently for 
investment and growth”11 
 
Initially, there was some resistance and stone-walling amongst directors during the consultation 
stage12. Some of them perceived the CG code to be mismatched to the local ‘realities’ (e.g. why 
should everyone know so much about a private business?) and somewhat impractical (e.g. where 
can one find an independent director in such a small business community?). On the other hand, 
media and public opinion - freshly conscious of the recent corporate scandals - was generally 
more positive in that the government was finally starting to “control” the perceived excesses of 
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the private sector. It has to be said that the portraying of the private sector as an economic 
‘villain’ with unfair and opaque employment practices is part of the rhetoric used in Mauritian 
society and politics - undoubtedly originating from its colonial past and the collective memory of 
slave descendants and indentured labourers, particularly in relation to the European settlers who 
owned the sugarcane land and industry. To a certain extent, this is even acknowledged in the CG 
code. In several sections of the Mauritian CG, under the heading of “Diversity” and “Social 
Issues”, the authors reported on the need to contend with the fact that:  
“Mauritius is very diverse in terms of ethnic groups, religions and culture. As a result of this 
diversity a number of prejudicial behaviour patterns have evolved in corporate Mauritius…” 
(2004, p.8) 
 
A common public perception is that employment and promotion within the private and public 
sectors are linked to the “community” of the employee and that of the company’s shareholders. 
(2004, p. 113).  
 
Indeed, in 2005, the issue remains a potent one as one political party (now in power) successfully 
campaigned on the need to ‘democratise’ the economy i.e. to reduce the influence of the ‘few 
families’, whilst the outgoing party was perceived to have been ‘too close and sympathetic’ to 
the private sector demands. In such a context, the recent requirement for listed companies to 
adopt the CG code takes a peculiar and ‘local’ connotation – which is beyond the rational 
efficiency arguments put forward in the CG literature. 
 
Research Methods 
Annual Report Disclosures 
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As per the National Code of Corporate Governance, all listed companies, banks/financial 
institutions, large public and private companies (unlisted) and state-owned corporations were 
required to comply as from the financial year starting in July 2004. In view of the 
national/international visibility associated with companies listed on the SEM13, the authors 
decided to focus on this particular category, and collected annual reports for financial years 
ending on or before 31st December 2005. A total of 41 listed companies are listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius (SEM), with a total market capitalization of about US$2.4 billion14- 
particularly concentrated within the banks, insurance and financial institutions (35%), 
leisure/hotel sector (27%), commerce (13%) and investments (11%). To identify the extent of 
adherence to the Code, all the annual report disclosures were analysed and compared to the 
Code.  In a bid to maintain confidentiality, the companies’ names are not reported and a serial 
number (#1, #2, etc… #41) is used throughout the paper to identify each company. 
 
Given that the implementation is a fairly recent event, the study focused on a selection of CG 
requirements deemed evidential enough to measure the actual state of adoption/implementation, 
such as the provision of a separate CG report, a CG statement of compliance (and/or 
explanation), establishment of key committees15, remuneration-related, chairperson/chief 
executive officer (CEO) split, board composition (balance of executive, non-executive and 
independent non-executive members), and related party transactions (specifically involving 
directors). The selection is a reflection of the priority elements being researched in previous 
studies, namely from Laing and Weir (1999), Ow-Yong and Guan, 2000), PIRC (2004), and 
Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006). In addition, one detailed aspect i.e. statistics on attendance 
at board and committee meetings, was selected to confirm the actual existence of the CG 
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mechanisms. Whilst the assessment of the annual report disclosures would allow the gathering of 
factual information regarding actual CG adoption, a second task was to infer on the intended 
meanings conveyed in the respective CG so-called ‘compliance’ statements (Pole and Lampard, 
2002) - as a reflection of the company’s declared intentions relating to the code. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews of Company Directors  
In parallel to the assessment of CG disclosures from the annual reports, the authors sought the 
directors’ attitudes/perceptions to the code’s recent implementation. It is argued that an 
appreciation of the situation from a director’s perspective is critical to CG research, since 
directors are collectively (as a Board) responsible for the CG implementation/compliance 
process. Although postal questionnaires or similarly designed surveys (e.g. as in Hussain and 
Mallin, 2002, Solomon et al., 2003) are useful in gathering specific pre-determined views/facts 
from a large cross-sectional sample, there is virtually no opportunity to flesh out further in-depth 
views on aspects that might emerge from initial responses. Within the CG literature (particularly, 
in relation to board behaviour), the emphasis has been more on qualitative analysis based on 
interviews or ‘board in action’ interactions (Huse, 2005, p. 575; also in Samra-Fredericks, 2000a, 
2000b). In this study, it is thus relevant to document how individual directors interact with, and 
rationalise about, the values and implications of CG adoption and related disclosures.  
 
In light of the above, an interview checklist (Appendix 2) is used to enable, and elicit, a range of 
discussions with the directors. General statements on CG were occasionally expressed more as a 
means of starting the discussion rather than seeking a biased response to it. The researchers 
carried out an initial analysis of the relevant company annual report before attending the 
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interview, thereby ensuring a personalised approach to the questions. One of the main difficulties 
has been in securing participation to the interviews. Directors are generally reluctant to respond 
to research studies since they perceive that their views cannot remain anonymous in such a small 
country. The aim was to interview ten directors from the listed companies, with an emphasis on 
selecting them from diverse business sectors, age group, gender, professional background, and 
roles within their board(s). Unfortunately, after several refusals/cancellations, only nine 
interviews materialised but it is believed the intended diversity is largely achieved. Table 1 
below provides the relevant details on the interviewed directors – coded throughout comments 
from Director A, Director B, etc….to Director I.  
Table 1 – Particulars of Interviewed Directors 
Director 
 
Position in Listed Companies Any Membership in 
Sub-Committees  
Academic/Professional 
Background 
A.  #33 - Chief Executive Officer 
#15 - Non Executive Director 
#16 - Non Executive Director 
#28 - Non Executive Director 
None Economics 
B.  #17 - Independent Director Member of Audit 
Committee  
Qualified Accountant 
 
 
C.  
#23 - Chief Executive Officer 
#35 - Non Executive Director 
#12 - Independent Non Executive 
Director 
 
 
Chairman of CG 
Committee and (#35) 
Member of Audit & Risk 
Committee (#35) 
Member of CG and Audit 
Committees (#12)  
Banker  
D.  #2 - Executive Director  
 
None Businessman 
E.  #16 - Executive Director None Engineering 
 
F.  #24 - Director and Company 
Secretary  
None Qualified Accountant 
G.  #19 - Non Executive Director 
#38  - Director 
#37 - Director and Company 
Secretary.   
Chairman CG Committee 
(#38) 
Member of Audit 
Committee (#37) 
Economics and Qualified 
Accountant. 
 
 
H.   
#5 -   Director 
#32 - Director 
#14 - Non Executive Director 
#37 - Non Executive Director 
#39 - Non Executive Director 
#40 - Non Executive Director 
Chairman CG Committee 
(#32) 
Member of CG 
Committee (#37 & #40) 
 
Management  
 
I.  
#26 - Independent Director  
#12 - Executive Director 
Chairman of CG 
Committee (#26) 
Business Administration and 
Accounting 
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All the interviews (performed in late 2006), whose duration ranged from 60 to 90 minutes, were 
tape-recorded or handwritten - where the directors declined the use of recording equipment. The 
findings will now be presented and analysed.  
 
Findings and Analysis 
Annual Report Disclosures 
This section details the actual extent of disclosures from the companies’ annual reports, as 
evidence of an actual implementation of the various CG aspects/mechanisms. These are 
summarised in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 – Summary of CG Disclosures 
 
 N = 41 % 
A. Chair of the Board 
 
A.1 Chair is an INED 
A.2 Chair is a NED 
A.3 Chair is a NICB (Non-Independent Chairperson of the Board) 
A.4 Chair is not categorised as INED or NED 
 
A.5 Chair separate from CEO 
A.6 Chair is also CEO 
A.7 Unspecified whether Chair is also CEO or separate from CEO 
A.8 Company does not have a CEO as part of the Board 
 
 
 
 
7 
29 
3 
3 
 
36 
0 
1 
5 
 
 
17.1 
70.7 
7.3 
7.3 
 
87.8 
0.0 
2.4 
12.2 
B. Composition of the Board 
 
B.1    At least 2 Executive Directors 
B.1.1 Less than 2 Executive Directors 
B.2    At least 2 INEDs 
B.3    Board is made up of only NEDs or INEDs  
 
B.4 % INED as part of the Board: 
0 – 25% 
25 – 50% 
> 50% 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
14 
26 
5 
 
 
13 
11 
5 
 
 
53.7 
34.1 
63.4 
12.2 
 
 
31.7 
26.8 
12.2 
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C. Setting Up of Formal Committees 
 
C.1 At least the following committees: 
C.1.1 Audit Committee 
C.1.2 CG Committee  
C 1.3 Both Audit and CG Committees 
 
C.2 Other Committees 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
35 
35 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
90.2 
85.4 
85.4 
 
34.1 
D. Board and Committee Meetings 
 
D.1     Board Meetings held at least quarterly 
D. 1.1 Board Meetings held less than quarterly 
D. 1.2 Frequency of Board Meetings not disclosed 
 
D.2 Attendance of Directors at Board Meetings 
D.3 Attendance of Directors at Committee Meetings 
 
 
 
30 
4 
8 
 
34 
25 
 
 
73.2 
9.8 
19.5 
 
82.9 
61.0 
E. Communication and Disclosures 
 
E.1 Statement of Remuneration Philosophy 
E.2 Remuneration figure detailed per Director 
E.3 Separate CG Section 
E.4 Statement of CG Compliance (including statements of  non-compliance) 
E.5 Related Party Transactions  
 
 
21 
9 
35 
34 
7 
 
 
 
51.2 
22.0 
85.4 
82.9 
17.1 
 
 
With respect to the separation between the CEO and the Chairperson of the Board, it is noted that 
all applicable (i.e. where the CEO is a member of the Board) listed companies have achieved this 
split. This is a very satisfactory performance, given the UK’s own experience (92% - PIRC, 
2004, p. 489). However, only 7 companies (17%) have nominated an independent non-executive 
director (INED) to act as Chairperson. Whilst the code implicitly allows for non-executive 
directors (NEDs) to chair the board – as long as he/she brings “independence of mind and 
intellectual honesty to his/her role, irrespective of whether he/she is officially designated as 
independent” (2004, p. 22) – most of the companies convey the message that the Board may not 
be operating independently from the influence of executives and that a proper balance of 
power/authority has yet to be achieved (Ow-Yong and Guan, 2000, p. 128). Evidence of this is 
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actually acknowledged in the case of 3 companies, which both report having a Non-Independent 
Chairperson of the Board (NICB) – a non-existent category in the CG code.  
 
Insofar as board composition is concerned, the findings indicate a less positive picture. 
According to the Code, companies are expected to have a Board consisting of at least 2 INEDs 
and 2 Executive Directors.  Only 63.4% of the companies have reported that they have at least 
two Independent Directors and 53.7% have at least two Executive Directors on their Boards.  On 
average, INEDs made up 33.2% of a board but the percentage of INED composition per 
company board varied widely from 9.1% to 70%. Since the code only calls for an ‘appropriate’ 
balance between the three categories of directors, it may be concluded that companies have 
interpreted this requirement in a very liberal way. INEDs are a critical plank in the CG process, 
specifically in their roles in chairing - or at least having some significant influence in - the 
Audit/CG committees. As observed in at least one third of the surveyed companies, an 
insufficient proportion of INEDs signals uncertainty as to the balance of power within the board, 
suggesting that their existence on some boards can still be viewed as being more symbolic than 
substantive.  
 
The next aspect is the setting up of board committees. As per the code, companies are expected 
to have at least an Audit and a Corporate Governance Committee. A vast majority (35) of 
companies did meet this requirement, whilst some (14) actually went beyond the minimum 
expectations and set up other committees, notably in relation to nomination/remuneration and 
strategic planning. However, based on the disclosures of actual meetings and attendance 
statistics, there has been less evidence on the actual extent of activities at sub-board level. Whilst 
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34 companies disclosed information on board meetings (most of them with some satisfactory 
regularity), only 25 provided some measures of activity regarding sub-board committees. 
Although there are no rules as to the number of committee meetings (only guidelines), the code 
requires full disclosure of all board and committee meetings/attendance. As reported in Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros (2006, p. 134), the absence of disclosure raises the possibility that these 
committees did not actually meet, thereby leading to the possibility of a window-dressing 
behaviour - at least for some of the surveyed companies.  
 
The last sub-heading in Table 2 considered the disclosure of key statements as well as 
information on executive remuneration/interests. It is very promising to observe that nearly 85%  
(35) of the companies have disclosed the required separate section on Corporate Governance in 
whilst nearly 83% (34) have provided a statement of compliance/non compliance with the Code.  
However, as mentioned earlier, the statements were found to be quite diversely worded and this 
led us to consider this diversity in more depth in the next section, particularly in the relation to 
their actual level of CG adoption. The relatively lower levels of disclosure observed for 
remuneration-related information are also of concern. Only 51% (21) of the companies have 
provided a statement of remuneration philosophy in their reports. Even in these cases, the  
statements range from the blatantly ‘obvious’ to the more ‘down to earth’ ones – perhaps 
indicating some legitimate difficulties in appreciating what is meant by ‘remuneration 
philosophy’. In addition, only 22% (9) of companies have provided detailed remuneration figures 
(per director) and even fewer (7) have disclosed details on related party transactions specifically 
involving directors. In light of the socio-economic and political issues faced by private 
companies in Mauritius, this low extent of remuneration disclosure is perhaps expected but this 
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issue needs to be probed further via the interviews. It is worth noting that such issues have been 
less of a problem in the UK - and in some emerging economies (e.g. Cyprus, Krambia-Kapardis 
and Psaros, 2006) - whilst not a single company in Qu and Leung’s (2006) recent study of 
Chinese listed companies disclosed executive remuneration data.  
 
Overall, the annual report disclosures show a very good picture in the implementation of basic 
CG principles and requirements. However, there are also indications that a sizeable number of 
the listed companies may have adopted the CG code in a piecemeal and symbolic manner.  
 
Reality vs. Appearances: Analyzing the Statements of Compliance 
One key requirement in the national code is that companies shall state in their annual reports the 
extent of their compliance with the Code and shall, in their annual reports, identify and give 
reasons for areas of non-compliance (2004, p. 18). Whilst this requirement appears to be a 
straightforward disclosure implication - the ‘comply or explain’ principle used in most CG codes 
– an analysis of the actual company statements revealed a more varied, nuanced and occasionally 
inconsistent picture of CG adoption level. From Table 2, 7 of the 41 (17%) companies did not 
actually provide a statement, although they did disclose evidence of compliance with some of the 
CG aspects/mechanisms. The remaining 34 companies’ statements were analysed and a number 
of paradoxical cases were identified.  
 
Firstly, with regards to providing a clear statement of compliance (and/or identify specific 
exceptions), 9 companies provided such a statement but in reality, only three of them fully 
complied with all the surveyed CG aspects/mechanisms. Amongst the other six companies, there 
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were three particular glaring examples of differences between the appearance of the CG 
statement and the reality of its detailed CG disclosures, as detailed in Table 3A below: 
 
 
Table 3A – Examples from Stated Full-Compliers 
Statements (Appearance) Non-Disclosures (Reality) 
The board subscribes to and is fully committed to 
complying with the Code of Corporate Governance of 
Mauritius.  The directors continuously consider the 
implications of best practice corporate governance and 
are of the opinion that the company complies with the 
requirements of the Code of Corporate Governance in 
all material respects. (#5) 
No detailed remuneration disclosures; no information on 
who are the independent directors; no information on 
number of board and committee meetings; no 
information on directors’ attendance at 
meetings/committees. 
The Company is committed to sound Corporate 
Governance practice guided by the Corporate 
Governance report for Mauritius issued in 2003.  The 
Board of Directors has always believed in the good 
practice of corporate governance and therefore 
complied  with the Code of Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance framework from its 
inception.(#7) 
No detailed remuneration disclosures; no evidence of 
existing audit and corporate governance committees; no 
information on who are the independent directors. 
Compliance Statement: The Board is of the opinion 
that the company now complies with the requirements 
of the Code of Corporate Governance in all material 
respects. (#32) 
No statement of remuneration philosophy; no detailed 
remuneration disclosures; no information on number of 
board/committee meetings; no information on directors’ 
attendance at board/committee meetings. 
 
 
One initial interpretation from the above examples is that two of these companies referred to 
their board’s opinion in complying “in all material aspects” to the CG code. However, this was 
not certified by any independent party. Whilst the code suggested that external auditors might 
verify such compliance, none of the 44 listed companies have resorted to the input of their 
auditors.   
 
 
Secondly, a series of more subtle differences arise in some of the other 24 companies’ 
statements, whereby some allude to compliance without providing any information on aspects 
being not complied with. In this respect, the word ‘comply’ or ‘compliance’ is regularly used 
together with ‘committed’ or ‘commitment’ to the code but no explicit statements is made. 
Again, a few examples are provided in Table 3B below: 
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Table 3B – Examples Alluding to Compliance  
Statements (Appearance) Non-Disclosures (Reality) 
“The company is committed to the principles and 
practice of good Corporate Governance.  Company's 
policies and practices will where necessary be 
modified to comply with the CG Code” (#21) 
No statement of remuneration philosophy; no detailed 
remuneration disclosures; no information on who are the 
independent directors; no information on number of 
board/committee meetings; no information on directors’ 
attendance at board/committee meetings 
“The Company is committed to the principles and 
practice of good Corporate Governance.  The 
company's practices and policies will, where 
necessary, be modified to comply with the values 
enshrined in the Code of Corporate Governance”(#30) 
No statement of remuneration philosophy; no detailed 
remuneration disclosures; no information on number of 
committee meetings; no information on directors’ 
attendance at committee meetings. 
“The Company is committed to the highest standard of 
business integrity, transparency, and professionalism 
in all activities to ensure that the activities within the 
company are managed ethically and responsibly to 
enhance business value for all stakeholders.  As an 
essential part of this commitment, the board 
endeavours to comply with the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Mauritius”(#8). 
No statement of remuneration philosophy; no detailed 
remuneration disclosures; no CG committee set up; No 
information on actual number of (Audit) sub-committee 
meetings; No specific director disclosures relating to 
related-party transactions. 
 
 
Thirdly, a sub-category of the above-mentioned 24 companies do not provide as such a statement 
of, or alluding to, compliance. They rather provide a discursive statement on the need to balance 
compliance to rules and adherence to higher principles, such as shareholder value, high 
governance standards etc. In some cases, this seems to reflect some opposition within the board 
(or from the company as a whole) on the need to comply with the detailed aspects of the CG 
code.  The main examples (labelled here as the “Debaters”) are detailed in Table 3C below: 
 
Table 3C – Examples of “Debaters” 
Statements (Appearance) Non-Disclosures  (Reality) 
The Board of Directors has set up an Audit Committee 
and a Corporate Governance committee to implement 
the requirements of the Code gradually, bearing in 
mind that this should be a leverage to enable us to 
further enhance shareholder value, and that the key to 
good corporate governance is to seek an appropriate 
balance between performance and conformance.(#18) 
 
 
 
No statement of remuneration philosophy; no detailed 
remuneration disclosures; no information on who are the 
independent directors; No information on actual number 
of sub-committee meetings. 
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The Board considers Corporate Governance as a 
matter of priority that requires more attention than 
merely establishing the steps to be taken to 
demonstrate compliance with legal, statutory, 
regulatory or listing requirements.  It is fully aware of 
the contribution that good corporate governance 
provides to the company in terms of growth, financial 
stability and performance.  Issues of governance will 
continue to receive the Board and its committees' 
consideration and attention during the years 
ahead.(#31) 
 
No statement of remuneration philosophy; no detailed 
remuneration disclosures; no CG committee set up; no 
information on who are the independent directors; 
The Board, management and staff of the Company fully 
support and are committed to the principles of business 
integrity, transparency and professionalism as 
recommended by the Code of Corporate Governance.  
We recognise that adhering to good governance 
principles is not merely compliance with a set of rules 
and regulations, but entails aiming for the highest 
standards of corporate governance.  Furthermore, we 
strive to ensure that all activities of the company are 
conducted as to satisfy the characteristics of good 
corporate governance, namely, discipline, 
transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness and social responsibility.(#19) 
 
No separate CG report; No statement of remuneration 
philosophy; no detailed remuneration disclosures; no 
information on who are the independent directors; no 
information on number of board meetings; no 
information on directors’ attendance at meetings 
 
Finally, whilst the above has perhaps focused on the more visible mismatches between the 
companies’ statements and their actual levels of CG disclosures, it is also noted that few 
companies actually fully complied with the main CG aspects/mechanisms, but did not explicitly 
state it. For example, the following statements originate from such companies (respectively 
company #33 and #39): 
“The Board is striving to apply principles of good governance at the level of the Group as well 
as within the Company.” (#33) 
 
“During the year under review, the Group ensured that its operations yielded acceptable 
returns to stakeholders and were conducted in a way that displayed the following 
characteristics of good governance, namely discipline, transparency, independence, 
 26 
accountability, fairness and social responsibility. The Board of Directors will ensure that the 
principles of good governance are followed and applied throughout the group”.(#39) 
 
Also, two companies (#11 and #14), which did not provide a CG statement at all, had fully 
complied with all other surveyed elements of the CG code. On the whole, the key findings from 
this section is that a majority of companies provided statements which were either (i) too general 
to project a clear image as to their actual level of implementation or (ii) squarely at odds with 
their actual level of implementation.  
 
There is little opportunity to compare the above findings with other studies, except (to a small 
extent) to a study of UK non-compliers (McNeil and Li, 2006). They state that UK non-
compliers provide extremely brief and uninformative disclosures to explain the reasons for non-
compliance (2006, p. 489). The authors report on a detailed example of a serial non-complier i.e. 
Wm Morrison Supermarkets, whose statements were viewed to be rather opaque and dismissive 
of the accountability provisions of the code.  They argue that such statements would preclude 
any serious and reasoned assessment of this non-compliance. In a similar vein, it is believed that 
the observed mismatches between CG statements and actual compliance would have a negative 
influence on the external user’s understanding of the companies’ disclosure/implementation 
decisions, since he/she would not have access to non-public information. Hence, in an attempt to 
seek further clarifications and answers on the motivations/arguments behind the CG statements 
and the actual adoption levels, relevant excerpts from the interviews with the directors are now 
presented and analysed. 
 
Directors’ Attitudes towards CG Implementation 
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In presenting the findings from the interviews, this section seeks to emphasise on the diversity of 
views and attitudes expressed rather than consider how many directors concurred (or not) to 
particular statements of fact or opinion. Whilst the interview checklist has allowed for the 
discussion of a wider range of aspects relating to the corporate governance, the authors have 
focused on four themes identified from the interviews, which were deemed more relevant to the 
findings from the previous sections.  
 
(i) CG Code in Mauritius – Legal, Quasi-Legal, or Voluntary? In this respect, directors did have 
varying views on the ‘status’ of the CG code. For example: 
“By now, listed companies should have complied with at least 95% of the code’s requirements 
and then indicate or explain when explain what they intend to do with the remaining rules. It is 
perhaps ok for other [unlisted] companies not too comply but still they have to explain.” 
(Director A) 
 
“…it is a code and not law so you cannot enforce.  If I don’t comply I explain.  It is up to the 
market to judge.  If I did not comply but I did explain and the market judge this satisfactory, 
then it’s Ok.  Also, the question is how many people read the annual report.  It is always the 
perception of the company.  It is not the annual report which will change the perception on the 
company.  The most important thing is that it’s only a code, so you cannot force people to 
implement – e.g. for listed companies, they do it because they are listed – as per the listing rules 
– so if you want to be part of the game you have to disclose. It’s not law and would be too rigid 
for Mauritius.  At least, I think we [as listed companies] have done a step forward”. (Director 
B, similar argument by Director I) 
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“Well all companies cannot abide by the Code at once.  All this needs an adaptation time.  It is 
not something that should be rushed into.  A steady and careful introduction of the Code is 
better, rather than seeing all companies abiding by it on paper and in reality they are not able 
to put it into practice” ”. (Director H) 
  
“In our case we practise good governance and if in certain instances, we did not go by the 
code, it was not on purpose.  I am sure that is probably the case with other companies as well”. 
(Director E) 
 
In addition, during some of the discussions, the issue of the wording (or absence) of the 
statements of compliance emerged. For example, Director C acknowledged the issue (for 
Company #35) stating: 
“Yes this is true, there were no details.  At the time when our last report was prepared we had 
not yet finalised our procedures and take in charge the secretariat of the company. We have 
preferred to include a general sentence.  We are now more prepared for the next report, so I 
think there should not be comments like this” (Director C) 
 
“Yes, I purposefully did not include the statement.  I tried to abide by the code as much as 
possible but as a precaution I preferred to avoid stating it” (Director F).    
 
To some extent, these statements can be interpreted as being symptomatic of the issues 
associated with having a Code based on a ‘comply or explain’ approach. The flexibility inherent 
in the CG code can be interpreted as the code being voluntary and therefore there is no need to 
comply (Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006, p. 137) or even one can decide which aspect to 
comply to. Coupled to that is the local context of the different types of regulations and regulators 
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(stock exchange, banking/financial institutions) which have all required the adoption of the code 
but which have not engaged in any monitoring of the process. For example, Director B refers to 
listing rules which required the adoption of the code but clearly asserts that it is not legally 
required and should be more market driven. On other hand, Director A and E seem to believe 
that all listed companies should comply, whilst Directors H and C appear to favour a relatively 
phased approach to the whole process (whilst the code did not specifically provide it). This 
confusion is also apparent from Director F’s who argues having complied in all material aspects 
but took an over-precautionary decision in not providing any statement.   
 
(ii) Role of a CG Code in Mauritian Companies: The directors put forward their own attitudes on 
the motivations for CG adoption/implementation. For example, various directors concur with the 
argument that the code will be beneficial in enhancing foreign investors’ confidence, particularly 
for companies located in a remote country, far away from the main financial centres: 
“The code will have a positive influence on foreign investment. Mauritius will be perceived as a 
country which means serious business” (Director F, similar statement by Director E) 
 
“Foreign investors will compare their return to the return which they have in their home 
country.  They find that the companies in Mauritius are undervalued.  There is potential – the 
feedback that I have heard from the road shows organised last year – the foreign investors 
believe that local companies have potential of growth. The companies are not well known 
elsewhere but they have potential.  Also, they believe that the legal framework in Mauritius is ok 
– this perception is right as we are not a ‘Banana Republic’. Now the CG reports in annual 
reports are at least showing the company means business even if they have not complied 
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hundred percent - at least they are moving towards that direction Lately, there has been keen 
interest amongst the foreign buyers on the listed market”. (Director B) 
 
“Generally, people are risk averse and they will prefer good governance at corporate level. 
Other African countries such as Nigeria or Seychelles have bad reputations and international 
investors are wary of companies there. Reputation is important within the CG framework” 
(Director A) 
   
On the other hand, other respondents have emphasised on different motivations (or criticisms): 
“If a company abides by the code it will be viewed positively by it employees and potential 
employees.  Employees will believe in the good running of the organisation and this will 
definitely have a positive impact on the productivity” (Director G). 
 
 “There was once a situation where the managing director informed the Board that we have a 
very tight time limit, we have to give a contract to a contractor and that he did not have time to 
make a full tendering procedure.  He recommended to the Board this company X as it had given 
a correct price.  He said they can do the job and he would like to give them the contract.  So we 
talked round the table, the audit and CG Committees gave their point of views and we said OK.  
We will still go forward and we note the decision taken.  The question was asked by the CG 
committee but we have decided that for operational reasons we decide to go forward still.  I was 
agreeable because I think there has been disclosure [amongst the directors].  On the other hand 
we have not been following the rules as we should have but what would not have been right is 
that the Managing Director does not speak about it to the Board and tried to approve the 
contract”.  (Director C) 
        
 31 
 “I do not believe in theory.  I believe in good practice.  We are not here to steal we are here to 
manage the company and we are doing everything for that and that is enough.  Everything has 
to be 100% transparent [but within the company].  The rest do not matter.  We can write huge 
CG reports of 50 pages but I do not believe in all that” (Director D).  
 
The second category of statements reflects a variety of social- and informal-led perceptions on 
the role of corporate governance principles and mechanisms. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the 
private sector is striving to eliminate decades-old perception of favouritism in recruitment and 
poor labour relations, thereby explaining Director G’s statements. On the other hand, the 
instances of corporate fraud and the general perceived opacity of local businesses may have 
influenced Director D’s statements and his opinion that CG reports, by themselves, do not 
convey a message of better transparency and integrity. Director C’s illustration of the use of CG 
committees as an ex-ante authorisation system (rather than an ex-post control one) is a very good 
example as to how CG principles/practices are being internalised (and hence actually 
implemented) in the context of a tightly- and informally-connected business community. From 
the ‘story’, one can also interpret the managing director’s actions as a politically motivated one - 
in seeking to implicate non-executive directors in an executive decision - in order to avert 
potential blame16.  
 
One potential interpretation is that these statements highlight the different perspectives on the 
role of CG as perceived by directors, ranging from an “international-oriented” perspective 
(originating from a rational value-maximising expectation e.g. more foreign investment) to a 
“local-oriented” one, that seeks to ‘fit’ the CG code to the local socio-economic realities. 
However, this is not suggestive of a ‘rigid’ dichotomy in that one company (or even one director) 
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adopts either an international-oriented or a local-oriented perspective to corporate governance 
adoption. These perspectives appear to surfaces from other parts of the discussions on the 
relevance and/or disclosure of particular CG aspects.  
 
(iii) Remuneration Disclosures: As identified in Table 2, information relating to directors’ 
remuneration and related party transactions was one of the least complied elements of the CG 
code. Yet a minority of companies provide more detailed disclosures on a per director basis – 
deemed to be a ‘sensitive’ issue in the local context. This therefore indicates a more nuanced 
approach, which is reflected in the interviews: 
“We need information on both the actual remuneration/fees and the bases used to reward 
directors. It creates a market for executives. We recently asked a consultancy firm to research 
top management salaries in Mauritius and it found that we [in this company] were poorly paid. 
Yes, there was some initial resistance for detailed disclosures and people compared it to the 
higher level of disclosures in India: a country which has much greater disparity between rich 
and poor than us. But others argued that India is a big country and no one really knows each 
other, and this is not the case in Mauritius. Personally, I do not think it is a problem. Since we 
have disclosed the information, I have not seen anything written in the press nor have I heard 
resentments from staff” (Director A) 
 
“I know a company in which the Managing Director has accepted to abandon a share of his 
remuneration when he realised that it will be known.  What this means is that the directors of 
companies start to realise that they will have to explain and they cannot carry on giving figures 
just like that.  This brings us to world [international] situations you know-there are salaries 
which are ‘exorbitant’ given to directors in Europe and the US.  This has shocked the 
population.  This will force directors to be more careful and not to exaggerate” (Director C) 
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“I have seen some reports, [Company #33], for example, has disclosed the salaries.  But why 
does the code asks for such disclosure? Is it for transparency?  But what kind of transparency, 
why do those reading the report need such information? If shareholders require it they may 
make a request for it.  I believe it can do a lot of harm” (Director E) 
 
“The code asks for the disclosure of the salaries of individual directors and we think that it will 
come.  We believe that it is useful information but it all depend to what use it is being used.  
Company #26 has not disclosed but Company #12- another company where I am - has done so” 
(Director I). 
 
The above does reflect a changing trend in Mauritius, in terms of the directors’ attitudes towards 
disclosure of information initially deemed to be ‘too personal or confidential’. Some of them 
justify the increased transparency as being (firstly) beneficial to all directors and as being a 
normal evolution to an “international-oriented” view of CG. However, the statements also reflect 
deep concerns (if not fears) as to the social and/or political consequences of such disclosures for 
the company. Yet, only one listed company specifically the issue in its annual report, stating it 
has complied with the CG code, except for the disclosure of remuneration of directors on an 
individual basis, because “the Board believes that it is not desirable in the local context to do so 
and shall comply at an appropriate time. The Committee/Board will review this on an annual 
basis.”(Company #36). The fact that several government officials are directors on this board 
indicates that these concerns are not purely those of some private sector. However, one may 
argue that the fear of ‘social consequences’ is irrational and imaginary (as implied by Director 
A). However, it remains that a ‘locally-minded’ perspective seems to be still at work, particularly 
 34 
when it came to the ‘wisdom’ of disclosing directors’ remuneration and related party 
transactions.   
 
(iv) Extent and Role of Independent Non-Executive Directors: The CG disclosures indicated a 
varied level of implementation amongst Mauritian listed companies, specifically when it came to 
the inclusion and use of independent non-executive directors on boards. The CG philosophy and 
requirements provide for the substantial involvement of INEDs, particularly in acting as counter-
balance to the executive ‘faction’ within the board and in bringing independent judgement.  
Again, it was argued that the smallness of the country and that of its business community would 
influence the extent to, and the manner in, which companies would implement requirements 
relating to INEDs. However, the views differ in some respects: 
“I do not think that there is an actual shortage of independent directors. People struggle 
‘mentally’ to find directors. I think it is due to this compartmentalisation of the Mauritian 
society, where we are categorised in relation to our culture and profession. So we don’t seem to 
be looking far enough from the usual circles.”  (Director A) 
 
“We have two independent directors because they are not related to the company in the first 
place.  But still there is one who has been here for the last 20 years. In England, for example, 
they say that the notion of independence is lost if you stay for too long. I know that the code 
recommends that we change from time to time.  Hence, we are trying to see how we can do that.  
It is a bit border-line. For example, on the Boards, many companies used to have retired 
directors.  These people can bring knowledge but on the other hand they have lost contact with 
the current business running” (Director C) 
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I tend not to agree 100% with this idea [i.e. independent directors].  I believe that the best 
persons to defend the interest of the company are the shareholders.  If I am a big shareholder of 
the company and I am on the Board, I will defend the interest of the company than an 
independent director. At the end of the day, when we declare dividends, these will go in my 
pocket.  Whereas the independent directors, they do not care.  They do not have any interest e.g. 
in those instances, some directors attend boards but have not done any thinking in between the 
meetings.  Those who are interested will think, collaborate; will phone the CEO, tell him look I 
have an idea, what do you think and so on.  Ok I believe it is fine to have independent directors 
but I believe that those who have an interest who will be more apt to defend the interest of the 
company. (Director D) 
 
“There may be criteria defining independence in the code, but it very hard to find people 
abiding by all these in Mauritius.  We are a very small country.  We have to believe in the 
person and who he is related to. In Mauritius people tend to associate people to other related 
parties and because a few misbehave, drastic rules are imposed on others. Regarding 
Independent Directors we have to believe in the integrity of the person.  What the code requires 
is a short term solution. It is more a culture thing.” (Director E) 
 
“It was not easy to find people who are really independent.  Not only independent, but people 
who will bring value to the Board.  Finding independent people is good but finding someone 
who is independent and who will bring value to the Board this is not easy. Now even if you 
recruit someone who is not totally independent and it is disclosed and discussed, I do not see 
any problem with that”  (Director I). 
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From the above statements, it would appear that some directors and companies seek to achieve a 
more substantive implementation of the CG requirements in relation to INEDs. Generally, this 
involves recruiting outside the immediate business community (e.g. academia) and seeking more 
directors from abroad (e.g. as stated by Director H). However, in other cases, directors seem to 
conclude that a certain level of ‘fudging’ is inevitable and therefore acknowledge that an 
international-oriented notion of INED is unworkable in the Mauritian context. In fact, Monks 
(2001, p. 144) similarly challenged this very notion of independence in that every independent 
director will feel personally beholden to those who have appointed him/her. He therefore (2001, 
p. 147) contended that the carefully crafted definitions of independence included in CG codes 
merely create an appearance that is disconnected from reality. This seems to be the case when 
assessing some of the views expressed by the above-mentioned directors. Finally, Director D 
(and to a lesser extent, Director I) question the wisdom of having independent directors and 
whether they can effectively contribute to the board process. Likewise, Laing and Weir (1999, p. 
463) stated that simply striving to have an acceptable number of INEDs may in fact create inertia 
problems as these directors struggle to understand the business, thereby slowing the decision-
making process and the board’s effectiveness.  
 
Overall Analysis and Implications 
Firstly, based on the evidence gathered from annual report disclosures, listed companies in 
Mauritius appeared to have resolutely embraced the majority of the key CG principles and 
mechanisms, as required by the national code. Although a strict comparison cannot be made to 
previous studies, the disclosures initially indicate a higher level of adoption compared to some of 
the countries listed in Appendix 1. In spite of the comments made during the interviews 
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concerning the legal basis of CG adoption, most companies appeared to have erred on the side of 
caution and sought to comply at least on some ‘visible’ issues e.g. chairperson/CEO split, more 
NEDs/INEDs, and the setting up of Audit/CG committees. However, a number of less positive 
findings and issues also emerged from the analysis of the disclosures, namely the low number of 
boards being chaired by an INED, a small number (and proportion) of INED for a significant 
number of boards, uncertainties as to the actual operation of audit/CG committees, and a low 
level of disclosure relating to directors’ remuneration and related party interests. Although these 
aspects may represent quantitatively a small number of the code’s requirements, they are 
nevertheless qualitatively very important in ensuring an effective and transparent CG process 
within the company. The absence of some of these aspects is thus suggestive of a piecemeal 
adoption - towards maintaining organizational legitimacy - but importantly, this ‘behaviour’ did 
not apply to all the listed companies.  
 
Secondly, further evidence of a legitimacy motivation came from the analysis of the companies’ 
compliance statements, which indicated a rather unorthodox diversity in the wording, meaning, 
structure and semantics used to convey an image of compliance – whilst this was not the case for 
most companies. As such, the CG statements appear to be “window-dressed” as it is presumably 
a key element sought by annual report users, before going into the specific aspects. Although 
companies are not certainly expected to apply 100% of the CG requirements, they are however 
expected to explain/reason in detail all instances of non-compliance. Only one company did so 
whilst a significant number of statements specifically linked CG to more idealistic notions, using 
words such as “professionalism”, “integrity” and “transparency”. This therefore reinforces the 
view that some companies crafted their statements to convey at least an image of symbolic 
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compliance for legitimation and reputational, vis-à-vis the government, the public, employees, 
shareholders, investors and/or other stakeholders. 
 
Thirdly, the directors’ responses revealed an equally diverse and varied set of perceptions on the 
CG code generally and on its implementation specifically in the Mauritian context and within 
their respective companies. For example, the diversity in the statements adopted by companies 
and directors’ comments may have arisen due to uncertainties as to the real “statutory or 
regulatory” nature of the CG code. Indeed, the term “compliance” – particularly in the domain of 
company financial reporting - denotes a strict adherence to a legal requirement (such as IFRS) 
included in a Companies Act. In this case, the CG code was given legal backing due to a recent 
law which established the Financial Reporting Council – officially the body in charge of 
monitoring and enforcement. However, since the political changes in 2005, the FRC has not been 
operative. In addition, as part of its Listing Rules, the SEM has required listed companies to 
comply with the code whilst banks/financial institutions have been required by their respective 
regulators to comply as well. In spite of these various laws, rules or requirements, there does not 
seem to be any monitoring and enforcement. In such a context, the companies’ statements may 
well denote some misconceptions and confusion as to whether CG compliance is a legal 
requirement or not – an issue which was at the heart of McNeil and Li’s (2006) arguments.  
 
However, the combination of the annual report disclosures/statements and the interviews indicate 
a spectrum of attitudes/perceptions amongst companies/directors towards the role and use of CG 
principles and requirements - anchored by an ‘international-oriented’ perspective on one end and 
a ‘local-oriented’ perspective on the other. The former perspective privileges international 
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reputation and broader organizational legitimacy since this will lead to the (eventual) rational 
expectation of attracting more foreign investors, higher confidence, lower risk premiums, better 
shareholder values and a broader commitment to social responsibility. In this respect, it is a 
pragmatic CG application (Burton, 2000, p. 201), calling for the resolution of the so-called 
controversial ‘local’ issues (remuneration and related party disclosures, recruiting more 
convincingly ‘real’ INEDs and actually transferring authority to them, developing transparent 
employment and business practices etc.). In the long run, this perspective is also consistent with 
the World Bank’s ideal of ‘unlocking shareholder value’ in Mauritian companies. On the other 
hand, the ‘local-oriented’ perspective seeks to cherry pick certain CG aspects to at least project 
an image of compliance/implementation whilst rejecting other CG requirements and disclosures 
which would ‘disturb’ the local status quo (existing non-independent directors, controlling 
disclosure of information on a ‘need to know’ basis, the maintaining of informal networks). In 
this respect, directors embracing this perspective are more mindful of the local socio-economic 
realities when interpreting and implementing CG code. However, it is acknowledged these two 
perspectives merely represent extreme scenarios. Most companies/directors will certainly be 
located along the spectrum. In a way, this is similar to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004)’s 
arguments that both efficiency and legitimation can influence CG diffusion, at the company 
rather than at a country level. The main difference is that legitimation goals appear more 
predominant from the directors’ interviews, with different end results in mind.  
 
From a different viewpoint, Ararat and Ugur (2003, p.72) assert that changes in rules, legislation 
and enforcement do not mean changes in values, behaviour and attitude. More precisely 
however, the evidence shows that changes in rules, legislation and enforcement have a varying 
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effect on values, behaviour and attitudes, depending on how the companies/directors perceive the 
role of CG and the motivations for its implementation. In contrast to other studies which argue 
for a ‘blanket’ effect of the country social-political-economic context on CG implementation, we 
argue that these socio-political factors have had varying effects on the individual 
companies/directors’ behaviour and attitudes.  
 
Conclusion 
This study sought to investigate the recent adoption of a CG code amongst listed companies 
operating in a developing economy context. It started by establishing the levels of adoption 
immediately after the enactment of the CG code. Based on previous theoretical 
studies/arguments, this paper adopted an institutional perspective in an attempt to explain or 
disentangle the factors, forces and motivations behind CG implementation in Mauritius.  
The analysis of annual report disclosures first showed a very good level of compliance insofar as 
the key aspects of the CG code were concerned, particularly when this is compared to previous 
experiences in other countries. At the same time however, certain detailed aspects and seemingly 
deliberate omissions (e.g. chairperson’s status and independence, balance of INEDs on boards, 
attendance statistics at sub-board, remuneration and related party) amongst some companies 
raised questions as to whether these companies have adopted a selective implementation strategy 
whilst seeking to convey an image of compliance. This was further reinforced by the use of 
compliance statements which were at best vague and uninformative - or at worst contradictory – 
in relation to the company’s actual level of adoption, whilst a mere ‘comply or explain’ 
statement would have sufficed. However, the directors’ attitudes and perceptions were helpful in 
identifying the factors contributing - at different degrees – to the company’s level of adoption 
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and disclosure behaviour. Initially, a genuine misunderstanding and confusion as to the legal 
status of the code, its detailed requirements and the ‘comply or explain’ principle appear to exist 
amongst some of the directors (and boards) - in spite of the lengthy preparations, consultations 
and discussions pre-2005. This issue is further compounded by the relative lack of monitoring 
observed from regulators and institutional shareholders (e.g. pension funds), since the code was 
implemented. In other countries, the latter stakeholders are known to take position and pressure 
for CG changes but this has not happened in Mauritius. 
 
Crucially however, we conclude that the pursuit of organizational legitimacy, rather than the 
expectation of efficiency rewards, is the driving factor in influencing Mauritian companies as to 
the type and level of CG requirements to adopt. However, the various directors’ opinions and 
attitudes indicate a different conceptualization of the use of CG for ‘organizational legitimacy’: 
(i) one which favours the ‘international reputation’ properties of the CG code, with the 
understanding that this may have a consequential effect on various outcomes (investment, higher 
share prices, lower risk ratings, transparency), and (ii) one which privileges an inward-looking 
and selective interpretation of the CG code, that seeks to rationalise the CG 
mechanisms/practices to fit the directors/companies current agenda and one that is less willing to 
challenge the country’s social realities. As mentioned before, these different ‘constructs’ of 
corporate governance can be represented within the same board and the annual report 
disclosures/compliance statements are the reflections of these different views. This suggests that 
further research may be needed within a single board to assess more precisely these different 
notions of CG.  
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Hence, this study contributes to the CG literature in providing a recent experience of how 
companies in developing countries adopt (fully or selectively) a corporate governance code and 
how organizational legitimacy plays a part in the implementation process. The study also 
demonstrates the usefulness of ‘unpacking’ the motivations, attitudes and perceptions of the 
decision-makers involved in the CG adoption/disclosure process.  
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Appendix 1 – Recent Selected Country Studies on Corporate Governance Compliance/Implementation 
 
Country 
(Study) 
Method (response 
rate, if applicable) 
Major Findings Major Factors/Interpretations/Implications 
put forward by the authors 
China 
(Qu and 
Leung, 2006) 
Annual Report 
Disclosures 
(Sample of 120 
Listed Companies) 
• 85% of sample, disclosing at least 
one aspect or element corporate 
governance  
• Evidence of very low adoption of 
audit and remuneration committee 
structures (less than 25%).  
• 50% disclosing general information 
on executive remuneration but no 
specific details provided. 
• No disclosure of related party 
transactions.  
 
 
• Culture - as per Hofstede’s framework – 
and cultural changes argued as relevant 
factors for CG disclosures, but no 
conclusive link made was made from the 
evidence. 
• Evidence of more frequent disclosures on 
employee-related issues rather than 
sensitive issues (such as related party 
transactions). The authors (p. 255) suggest 
this is indicative of an attempt at 
legitimising the company’s social status. 
 
Cyprus 
(Krambia-
Kapardis and 
Psaros, 2006) 
Annual Report 
Disclosures (160 
Listed Companies) 
• Only 46 (39%) lodged a CG report, 
with 40 (25%) achieving full or 
partial compliance 
• Majority of them did not split the 
CEO/Chairman role.  
• Low proportion of independent and 
non-executive directors in Board 
• Almost every complying company 
had an audit, nomination and 
remuneration committee.  
• Nomination committees did not 
appear independent.  
 
 
 
 
• Real status of independent and non-
executive directors remains questionable.  
• No regular meetings of committees, 
suggesting these are “tokenistic” (p. 134) 
• Unique cultural, legal and economic 
characteristics behind low compliance but 
suggests how “would one motivate a 
closely controlled company to comply”. (p. 
136) e.g. via tax incentives. 
• Family-owned managers not fully aware 
and need to be “educated”.  
• Non-compliance is largely culture-related 
i.e. since CG is a voluntary process - there 
is no need to comply. 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Greece 
(Tsipouri and 
Xanthakis, 
2004) 
Questionnaire 
Survey  
(120 out of 142 
Listed Companies ) 
(responses used to 
estimated 
standardized 
ratings, no 
information on 
respondent) 
• Generally, higher level of compliance 
associated to larger companies 
• 50% of companies do not split the 
CEO/Chairman role 
• Low establishment of board 
committees 
• Low compliance across the board for 
remuneration disclosures 
• Findings and individuals scores 
communicated to companies. No reporting 
of the companies’ own perceptions to the 
CG scores.  
• General agreement to the principles but 
little detailed implementation, when it 
came to the proportion of independent 
directors, the setting up of committees and 
disclosure of executive remuneration   
 
Portugal  
(Alves and 
Mendes, 2004) 
Questionnaire and 
Annual Report 
Disclosures  
(82 Listed 
Companies 
surveyed, for three 
financial years, 
response rate 
between 53% & 
73%)  
• In the latest financial year (2001),  
• 72% of companies had at least one 
independent director 
• 34% provided a CG statement,  
• 74% provided a disclosure on 
directors’ attendance at meetings 
 
• Reasonable balance between complying 
and non-complying companies. 
• No specific country requirement for 
separation between CEO/Chairman 
• No specific country requirement for the 
setting up of audit and remuneration 
committees (and determination of 
remuneration). 
 
 
Taiwan  
(Solomon et al, 
2003) 
Questionnaire 
Survey (55 out of 
252 companies – 
study of attitudes 
and 
implementation)  
 
(no information on 
respondent, use of 
closed-ended 
questions) 
• Overall positive attitudes towards CG 
principles.  
• Role of outside directors perceived to 
be very important 
• Majority of companies do not have an 
audit or remuneration committee 
• In majority of companies, directors 
selected by family members. 
• Equal proportion of outside and 
executive directors on boards. 
• However, more neutral attitudes to which 
model to be used.  
• Due to a two tier style used in Taiwanese 
boards, there is an individual supervisor 
who plays the role of the audit committee.  
• Priority in Taiwanese boards is to avoid 
conflicts.  
• Family control and crony capitalism needs 
to be diminished curbed for better 
governance. 
• Determination of remuneration and related 
policies were found not be sophisticated.  
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
Bahrain 
(Hussain and 
Mallin, 2002) 
Questionnaire 
Survey  
(21 out of 38 Listed 
Companies) 
(no information on 
respondent) 
• Separate person for CEO/Board 
Chairman 
• Director selected by board 
nomination or self-nomination 
• Little use of nomination committee 
• Higher proportion of non-executive 
directors 
 
• Large proportion of shareholders, acting 
also as directors 
• Directors tend to be fairly entrenched in the 
board.  
Malaysia 
(Ow-Yong and 
Guan, 2000) 
Questionnaire 
Survey  
(304 out of 722 
Listed Companies)  
(no information on 
respondent) 
• 31% do not split the CEO/Chairman 
role 
• Large proportion of shareholders, 
acting also as directors (including 
executive positions) 
• Equal proportion of independent 
directors on boards 
• Audit committees 100% present 
• 80% of companies do not have a 
remuneration committee 
 
 
• Audit committee required by listing rules. 
• Concern over impact of remuneration 
committee in cases where the board is 
dominated by key members/shareholders 
• Many companies pay “lip service or 
comply with the form and not the spirit” (p. 
130)  
• Owner-managers not fully aware of the 
implications.  
• Definition of independent directors remains 
debatable in the local context. 
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Appendix 2 - Interview Checklist 
 
Introductory information and re-assurances on interview being kept anonymous and confidential. 
 
1. The current level of compliance in listed companies in Mauritius. What are your initial 
perceptions and opinions on this? 
 
2. CG in Mauritius aims at gaining foreign investors confidence.  To what extent is this true and 
actually happening? 
 
3. How far has the code’s implementation of the code helped? Will the implementation of CG 
improve the overall performance of the firm? Please comment and elaborate. 
 
4. Can you describe the various aspects of the implementation phase in your company? 
 
5. What have you perceived to be the main issues or barriers encountered during that period? 
 
6. Can you provide any examples of a difficult or easy process?   
 
7. In terms of setting up of committees and board composition?  Can you describe what you 
perceive the major changes? 
 
8. (Where applicable) Based on your experience as board member or CEO in other companies, can 
you add to any experiences on the CG implementation? For example, were there difficulties in 
finding non-executive directors deemed independent? 
 
9. Have you been aware of any actions by regulatory authorities to consider what is happening in 
term of implementation?   
 
10. Has there been any/ increased demands from shareholders regarding the CG issue? 
 
11. How do you perceive the disclosure of remuneration (per director) issue?  
 
12. Consider the statement of compliance in the annual report. There is an option that auditors may 
be asked to assess the extent of compliance. Your comments. 
 
13. The code asks for the disclosure of attendance of directors at various meetings? Is this important? 
 
14. Regarding the actual preparation and interpretation of the CG report. What was the role of the 
Company Secretary and were they particular members of the Board who took up the issue? 
 
15. Level of training/ Development of Directors?  Are they briefed as to what should be their roles? 
 
16. Discuss the issue of disclosing in detail related party transactions in the annual report, specifically 
involving directors? 
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[1] Monks (2001) did briefly consider this reality vs. appearance issue when analyzing some specific aspects of CG, 
namely the selection of directors, the use of independent directors and the determination of executive remuneration.  
[2] A notable and important exception to this lax regulation regime is the case of the US, where the passing of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has led to a radically higher level of enforcement and scrutiny for both company 
directors and auditors – effectively a set of legally-enforced CG practices and mechanisms.   
[3] Purely for illustration purposes, one could contrast this ‘softly softly’ approach to the more aggressive strategies 
used to ‘push’ International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in these very same countries.   
[4] For example, refer to articles in the Financial Times such “Enron’s Hard Lessons for Corporate Bosses” (May 
27, 2006), “Corporate Governance” (Aug 21, 2006).  
[5] Indeed, the OECD CG principles are now considered as one the twelve key standards for sound financial systems 
(as identified by the Financial Stability Forum).   
[6] Alves and Mendes (2004) used a combination of close-ended questionnaire surveys and annual report 
disclosures, and there was no evidence that the survey respondents were actually company directors.  
[7] This can be viewed against the backdrop of recent UK evidence showing whilst only 47% of UK listed 
companies fully comply to the CG code, more than 85% of UK listed companies have implemented the key aspects 
mentioned (MacNeil and Li, 2006, p. 489) 
[8] www.worldbank.org/mauritius (Retrieved on December 18, 2006). Note that US$1=Mauritian Rupee (Rs) 33.35. 
[9] Refer for example to Durbarry (2004) and Subramanian and Roy (2001) for a more detailed of Mauritius’ past 
economic achievements and implications for the future.   
[10] Business Magazine, July 10, 2002. A ‘voluntary’ code of corporate governance – issued by a prominent 
business council – was put forward at that time but the actual level of implementation had been very low amongst 
listed companies.  
[11] Business Magazine, October 8, 2003 
[12] One of the authors was present during the consultations between the directors and the government-backed CG 
Committee. As a result, our comments and observations are based on the discussions witnessed at that time. 
[13] According to the SEM Factbook, the degree of foreign activity in the local stock market (based on turnover) 
represented about 20%  of the total turnover for 2005.   
[14] Stock Exchange of Mauritius 2006 Factbook, http://www.semdex.com/market_fbook.htm (Retrieved on 
January 15, 2007).   
[15] The local Code requires at the very minimum the establishment of a corporate governance committee 
(encompassing directors’ remuneration/recruitment) and an audit committee.   
[16] Particularly when it emerged from later discussions that the contracting company X was actually owned by one 
of the shareholders of the client company! 
 
